> ## Content Index > Fetch the complete content index at: https://www.traceoriginresearch.com/llms.txt > Use this file to discover other available public pages before exploring further. # 45 Children in Russia's Prosecution Machine: What Happens When the System That Doesn't Distinguish Targets Someone Under 18 - URL: https://www.traceoriginresearch.com/45-children-in-russias-prosecution-machine-what-happens-when-the-system-that-doesnt-distinguish-targets-someone-under-18/ - Published: 2026-09-04T22:03:05.000Z - Updated: 2026-09-16T22:44:48.000Z - Author: Eric Brattin - Tags: Russia Trace Origin LLC · Report IV Report IV · OVD-Info dataset · 7,132 prosecutions ## The system does not distinguish by *age.* Between 2009 and 2025, Russia opened 48 criminal prosecutions against approximately 45 children under the age of 18 (25 named, 20 anonymous or unidentified in the OVD-Info dataset). 12 are currently imprisoned. The youngest was 14\. The cases range from distributing anti-war flyers and building structures in Minecraft to attempted arson of military recruitment offices and, in one case, an alleged school shooting threat. The system applied the same Criminal Code articles, the same charging patterns, and the same facially incompatible statutes it uses on adults. It does not have a juvenile mode. Analysis Trace Origin LLC Data OVD-Info, 7,132 prosecutions Method SPARQL on 217,814 RDF triples Period 2009 to 2025 \*Imprisonment status from OVD-Info CSV field (В заключении): 12 currently imprisoned, 36 not. Anna Zhuravleva was released June 2025\. The SPARQL query initially returned 44 due to a mapping error between the CSV field and the ontology property; the correct figure from the raw CSV is 12\. "Under 18" follows the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC Art. 1), which defines a child as any person below 18\. Russian criminal liability begins at 16 for most crimes but at 14 for terrorism (Art. 205), murder, and mass riots. This report uses the international standard, not the Russian one. All names used in this report were previously published by the cited sources (OVD-Info, BBC, RFE/RL, Moscow Times, CNN, Novaya Gazeta, Memorial, Mediazona). 48 Prosecutions of minors under 18 (CRC) 14 Age of youngest terrorism defendant 35 Prosecutions after the 2022 invasion 12 Currently imprisoned prosecution velocity ## 13 prosecutions in 13 years. Then 35 in *four.* Before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the OVD-Info dataset records 13 prosecutions over 13 years (2009 to 2021). After the invasion, 35 prosecutions occurred in four years (2022 to 2025). The annual rate increased roughly fivefold. MINOR PROSECUTIONS PER YEAR 0 5 10 INVASION 09 2 15 17 18 19 20 3 21 4 22 6 23 12 24 7 25 10 Fig. 1 Minor prosecutions by year. The dashed line marks the February 2022 invasion. 73% of all child prosecutions in the dataset occurred after that line. what the dataset does not capture ## 45 is the floor. The real number is *at least 427.* The OVD-Info dataset records 45 minors across 48 prosecutions. But OVD-Info tracks only cases they can independently confirm as politically motivated. Multiple independent sources document a far larger scale: Memorial (August 2026)The Nobel Peace Prize-winning human rights group Memorial documented **427 cases of politically motivated criminal prosecution of minors** since the full-scale invasion. 299 persons under 18 have been deprived of liberty. 107 children are currently in detention. Memorial and OVD-Info are independent organizations with separate methodologies, case-selection criteria, and data-collection pipelines. Memorial's count may include administrative cases, different age cutoffs, or occupied territory cases that OVD-Info excludes. Direct comparison requires caution: the 45 in this report and Memorial's 427 may not be measuring the same thing. Source: [RFE/RL, August 2026](https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-teen-prisoner-protest-putin/33832932.html?ref=traceoriginresearch.com). Moscow Times (October 2025)Over 150 minors convicted on terrorism or sabotage charges since the invasion. 26 in 2022\. 35 in 2023\. 41 in 2024\. 29 in the first half of 2025 alone. Source: [Moscow Times / Novaya Gazeta](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/10/20/over-150-russian-teenagers-convicted-of-terrorism-or-sabotage-since-ukraine-invasion-report-a90868?ref=traceoriginresearch.com). Russia is lowering the age of criminal liabilityThe State Duma is considering legislation to lower the minimum age for criminal liability under "sabotage articles" from 16 to 14\. The current Criminal Code already permits terrorism charges (Art. 205) from age 14\. Source: [Kyiv Post, October 2025](https://www.kyivpost.com/post/63130?ref=traceoriginresearch.com). ### Why the OVD-Info number is lower In a meeting with OVD-Info's data and legal team (September 2026), the organization identified three structural gaps in their dataset that explain the discrepancy: **1\. FSB cases operate outside the court system.** The Federal Security Service conducts investigations and detentions that never enter the public court record. If no lawyer or family member contacts OVD-Info, the case is invisible. For minors recruited into sabotage by unknown handlers via Telegram (as documented by Novaya Gazeta), the FSB may detain, interrogate, and release without any court filing. These cases never reach OVD-Info's database. **2\. Terrorism and treason case materials are classified.** Under Russian law, cases involving Art. 205 (terrorism) and Art. 275 (treason) are heard behind closed doors by military courts. Case files are sealed. OVD-Info learns about them only when the lawyer, the family, or a journalist breaks the silence. The Kansk teenagers' trial (Uvarov, Mikhailenko, Andreyev) was held entirely behind closed doors. **3\. Occupied territories are not covered.** Crimea (since 2014) and the occupied regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson are largely invisible to OVD-Info's monitoring. Freedom House rates Russian-occupied territories at negative one on its freedom scale. Minors detained in these areas are outside the reach of Russian human rights organizations. As recently as September 2026, a 16-year-old in occupied Sevastopol was charged with participation in a terrorist organization, with no further details made public. The 45 minors in the OVD-Info dataset are the cases that broke through all three barriers: the case entered the court system, the case materials were at least partially accessible, and the case occurred in internationally recognized Russian territory with monitoring coverage. The 427 figure from Memorial (which includes cases from its own network, media monitoring, and court scraping) is closer to the real number, and Memorial itself says the actual count is likely higher still. ## At what age does the state decide you are a *terrorist?* | Age | Article | Charge | Name | Year | | --- | ------- | ------------------------- | ------------------ | ---- | | 14 | 205 | Terrorism | Egor Lauskis | 2023 | | 14 | 205.5 | Terror financing | Anna Zhuravleva | 2023 | | 14 | 354.1 | Rehabilitation of Nazism | Anonymous | 2024 | | 15 | 205.3 | Terror training | Nikita Uvarov | 2020 | | 15 | 205.1 | Terror facilitation | Gleb Koryakin | 2018 | | 16 | 205.2 | Terror recruitment | Eva Bagrova | 2024 | | 16 | 280 | Extremist calls | Lyubov Lizunova | 2022 | | 17 | 275 | Treason | Gagik Grigoryan | 2023 | | 17 | 318 | Violence against official | Mikhail Galyashkin | 2017 | Anna Zhuravleva was 14 years old when Russia charged her with terrorism (Art. 205) and terror financing (Art. 205.5). She faces 3 simultaneous ICCPR violations (Articles 14, 18, 22). She is still imprisoned. She is now approximately 17. who they are ## The names behind the *numbers.* Independent journalism has documented the circumstances of the most prominent cases. What follows is drawn from published reporting by BBC, RFE/RL, Moscow Times, CNN, Novaya Gazeta, Mediazona, Memorial, and OVD-Info. Nikita Uvarov Arrested age 14 (2020), Kansk, Siberia · Art. 205.3 (terror training) · 5 years penal colony · Re-prosecuted 2026 Uvarov and two classmates (Denis Mikhailenko and Bogdan Andreyev, both 14) were detained in June 2020 for distributing leaflets supporting imprisoned anarchist mathematician Azat Miftakhov. The FSB searched their phones and found they had built a replica FSB building in Minecraft and discussed blowing it up as a joke. The FSB presented the Minecraft gameplay as evidence of terrorist training. "I am not a terrorist, I am not guilty. I would just like to finish my studies, get an education and go somewhere far away from here, somewhere I don't irritate anyone from the special services," Uvarov said in his closing statement. He was sentenced to five years by a military court in a closed hearing. His two co-defendants received suspended sentences after cooperating with investigators. Their original confessions were described as extracted "under pressure and threats." In February 2026, weeks before his sentence was due to expire, a new criminal case was opened against him for alleged participation in an extremist organization. He remains in detention. Memorial recognized him as a political prisoner. He is now approximately 21. Sources: [RFE/RL](https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-teenager-minecraft-terrorism/31697608.html?ref=traceoriginresearch.com), [Moscow Times](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/02/10/russia-sentences-teens-over-terrorist-plot-to-blow-up-minecraft-fsb-building-a76328?ref=traceoriginresearch.com), [OVD-Info](https://ovd.info/en/express-news/2026/02/17/new-case-has-been-opened-against-nikita-uvarov-who-was-convicted-kansk?ref=traceoriginresearch.com), [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kansk%5Faffair?ref=traceoriginresearch.com) Arseniy Turbin Arrested age 15 (2023), Livny, Oryol Region · Art. 205.4 (terrorist organization) · 5 years juvenile colony · New charges 2026 Turbin was arrested after FSB agents raided his family's apartment at 6 AM. His actions: distributing anti-Putin flyers in neighbors' mailboxes and sending one email to the Free Russia Legion's Telegram bot saying he was "ready to stick up posters and fight Putin's propaganda." The Free Russia Legion stated it does not accept members under 18. Mediazona reported that the FSB falsified evidence: agents claimed Turbin admitted during a recorded interrogation to planning to join the Legion, but the recording contained no such statement. He was beaten in detention, lost 17 kilograms, had his head dunked in a toilet by a cellmate, and was officially listed by the detention facility as "prone to terrorism." He was added to Russia's federal list of terrorists and extremists, becoming the youngest person on the register. He turned 18 in August 2026\. New charges were filed shortly before. Memorial designated him a political prisoner. Sources: [Moscow Times](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/04/15/at-15-he-became-one-of-russias-youngest-political-prisoners-hes-now-facing-new-charges-a92495?ref=traceoriginresearch.com), [CNN](https://www.cnn.com/2024/12/05/europe/russia-teenagers-imprisoned-for-dissent-intl-cmd/index.html?ref=traceoriginresearch.com), [Moscow Times / Mediazona](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/06/27/russias-fsb-falsified-evidence-against-jailed-anti-war-teenager-mediazona-a85539?ref=traceoriginresearch.com), [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arseny%5FTurbin?ref=traceoriginresearch.com) Egor Balazeikin Arrested age 16 (2023), Kirovsk, Leningrad Region · Art. 205 (attempted terrorism) · 6 years · Autoimmune hepatitis Balazeikin threw homemade Molotov cocktails at two military recruitment offices in Kirovsk and St. Petersburg in February 2023\. None ignited. No casualties or significant damage. His uncle had been killed fighting in Ukraine as a volunteer. "If I hadn't done what I did, I would probably have hanged myself, because I can't go around with this weight in my heart, seeing how many people are getting killed," he told his mother after arrest. The charges were initially hooliganism but were reclassified as attempted terrorism. FSB officers threatened that he would be raped in the pretrial detention center. In the appeals hearing, he said: "I am humiliated to be put in the same category as \[the Moscow concert hall attackers\]. More than ever I realise now that I was wrongly convicted. Someday I will get out of prison, and I will know what conscience is." Balazeikin has progressive liver fibrosis and autoimmune hepatitis. His mother has said his continued imprisonment is "tantamount to a death sentence." He is now approximately 20 and being denied essential medical care. Sources: [Kyiv Independent](https://kyivindependent.com/russian-teen-sentenced-to-6-years-prison-for-trying-to-set-fire-to-military-recruiting-centers/?ref=traceoriginresearch.com), [Novaya Gazeta](https://novayagazeta.eu/en/articles/2024/04/03/court-upholds-sentence-of-russian-teenager-jailed-for-six-years-on-terror-charges-en-news?ref=traceoriginresearch.com), [RFE/RL](https://www.rferl.org/a/balazeikin-yegor-terrorist-military-recruitment-center-arson-attacks/32948771.html?ref=traceoriginresearch.com) Anna Zhuravleva Detained age 14 (2023) · Art. 205 (terrorism), Art. 205.5 (terror financing) · Released June 2025 Detained in November 2023 on suspicion of preparing an attack on her school and participating in the activities of a terrorist organization. According to reporting by Takie Dela, she encountered a private Telegram channel about school shootings while researching the topic. To join the channel, she was required to fill out a questionnaire using pre-written answers. She indicated she intended to carry out a shooting "four years" after filling it out. In detention, she was bullied by cellmates and transferred to a psychiatric hospital. A torture case was opened. She was released on her own recognizance on 17 June 2025 after the case attracted public attention and was transferred to a different investigator. Source: [OVD-Info](https://ovd.info/en/persons/anna-zhuravleva?ref=traceoriginresearch.com) One built a building in Minecraft. One put flyers in mailboxes. One threw a bottle that didn't ignite. One filled out a questionnaire on Telegram about a school shooting she said she would carry out in four years. The state called all four terrorists. The underlying conduct ranged from political expression to alleged violent intent. The legal instrument was the same. ### Speech, property, violence: what the 45 cases actually involved Not all 45 cases are the sameThe 45 prosecutions include a range of underlying conduct. Some involve only speech or expression (anti-war flyers, Telegram posts, social media criticism of Putin). Some involve property damage or attempted property damage (arson of recruitment offices, damage to railway equipment). Some involve allegations of participation in banned organizations (Free Russia Legion, AUE). A critic will note that this report does not distinguish between a 15-year-old sentenced for distributing flyers and a 14-year-old detained for setting fire to a railroad relay box. Both are charged under terrorism articles. The structural analysis finds that the system applies the same legal instruments regardless. But the moral weight of each case is not the same, and this report does not claim otherwise. The charge co-occurrence patterns and ICCPR violation counts describe the system's behavior, not the children's conduct. the span ## The same article. A 14-year-old and an *88-year-old.* The table below shows the youngest and oldest person charged under each Criminal Code article in the OVD-Info dataset. The same legal instrument is applied across the entire age range. AGE SPAN: YOUNGEST TO OLDEST UNDER EACH ARTICLE 10 30 50 70 90 AGE 18 282.2 71 yr span 205.2 69 yr span 205.1 68 yr span 275 62 yr span 354.1 61 yr span 280 282 205.5 318 205 Youngest (child) Oldest (adult) Fig. 2 Each bar spans from the youngest to oldest person charged under that article. Red dots are children. The dashed line marks age 18\. Every bar crosses it. Art. 282.2 (extremist organization): from a 17-year-old to an 88-year-old Jehovah's Witness. 71-year span. The same law. retroactive in spirit ## Prosecuted under a law that did not exist when they were *born.* Article 354.1 ("rehabilitation of Nazism") was enacted in 2014 and expanded in 2022\. Twelve children have been prosecuted under it. All were born after 2005\. The law was written, and within months, applied to minors. The oldest of these children was 17 when the statute was signed. The youngest was 15. 12 children prosecuted under Art. 354.1 a law that did not exist when they were born This is not retroactive prosecution in the formal legal sense: the alleged conduct occurred after the law was enacted. But the effect is the same. A child who was 14 when the statute was written was prosecuted under it at 15\. The state created the crime, then applied it to children who had no prior notice that the conduct was illegal, because the conduct was not illegal when they were old enough to understand the concept. the comparison ## Children are *more likely* to be charged under facially incompatible statutes. FACIALLY INCOMPATIBLE CHARGES: CHILDREN vs ADULTS Children 38% 18 of 48 Adults 26% 1,394 of 5,335 Fig. 3 Fraction of prosecutions using statutes that facially violate international law. 38% for children (18 of 48). 26% for adults (1,394 of 5,335). The difference is directionally consistent but the minor sample (n=45) is small. A chi-squared test yields p=0.04, which crosses the 0.05 significance threshold but would not survive a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. The finding should be read as indicative, not conclusive. SKOS facial incompatibility classifications are analyst judgments, not legally reviewed. What "facially incompatible" meansA statute is classified as facially incompatible when the text of the law, or its consistent pattern of application, is incompatible with ICCPR provisions. Some articles are incompatible as written: Art. 354.1 criminalizes "rehabilitation of Nazism," which is protected expression under ICCPR Art. 19 regardless of how it is applied. Others are incompatible as applied: Art. 205.5 criminalizes terror financing, but when applied to Jehovah's Witnesses for religious donations, it functions as a restriction on freedom of conscience (Art. 18). The distinction matters: "as written" incompatibility is a stronger claim than "as applied." The SKOS vocabulary does not currently distinguish between the two. All SKOS charge-to-ICCPR mappings are analyst judgments, not legally reviewed, and are disclosed as such. the rights violated ## Which rights did Russia violate against *children?* The SKOS vocabulary maps each Criminal Code article to the ICCPR provisions it facially violates. When a child is prosecuted under Art. 354.1, the ontology records a mapped violation of ICCPR Art. 19 (freedom of expression). When a child is prosecuted under Art. 205.5 (terror financing, applied to a Jehovah's Witness), the ontology records mapped violations of Art. 18 (freedom of conscience) and Art. 22 (freedom of association). These are structural mappings from domestic statute to international treaty provision, based on analyst judgment (not legally reviewed). ICCPR VIOLATIONS ON CHILDREN (48 PROSECUTIONS) Art. 19: Expression 23 Art. 14: Fair trial 8 Art. 18: Conscience 6 Art. 22: Association 5 Art. 21: Assembly 1 Fig. 4 ICCPR violations on children, as determined by SKOS charge-to-treaty mappings (analyst judgments, not legally reviewed). Nearly half of all child prosecutions involve charges mapped to Art. 19 (freedom of expression). 5 children face 3 or more simultaneous ICCPR violations. ### Compound violations: 5 children facing 3+ simultaneous rights violations | Name | Age | ICCPR violations | Charges | | ---------------- | --- | ---------------- | ------------ | | Anna Zhuravleva | 14 | Art. 14, 18, 22 | 205, 205.5 | | Gleb Koryakin | 15 | Art. 14, 18, 22 | 205.1 | | Arseniy Turbin | 15 | Art. 14, 18, 22 | 205.1, 205.5 | | Valery Zaitsev | 15 | Art. 14, 18, 22 | 205.1, 205.5 | | Unknown male 274 | 17 | Art. 18, 19, 22 | 282.2 | what it withholds ## Four articles the system uses on adults but *never on children.* Of all the high-frequency Criminal Code articles in the OVD-Info dataset, only four have never been applied to a minor. The question is whether this reflects restraint or opportunity. ADULT-ONLY ARTICLES (20+ CASES, ZERO CHILDREN) Art. 207.3 military fake news 375 adults, 0 children Art. 278 seizure of power 202 adults, 0 children Art. 280.3 discrediting army 201 adults, 0 children Art. 282.1 extremist community 132 adults, 0 children Fig. 5 Four high-frequency articles never applied to minors. But every article that IS used on children is also used on adults. The system does not have a separate juvenile instrument. It uses the same articles on both, and the four it withholds represent less restraint than coincidence: Art. 207.3 was enacted in 2022 and primarily targets social media posts by adults. The absence is not restraintArt. 207.3 ("military fake news") has 375 adult cases and zero children. But Art. 354.1 ("rehabilitation of Nazism"), enacted the same year, has 12 child cases. Both are wartime speech crimes. The difference is not policy: the system prosecutes children for calling for sanctions but not (yet) for posting "fake news." The distinction appears to reflect which cases investigators brought, not a deliberate boundary. Every article used on a child is also used on adults. The system has no juvenile category. what the system does not do to children ## No psychiatric detention. But *6 girls.* Zero of the 45 prosecuted minors are in compulsory psychiatric treatment. The adult dataset includes 84 persons in psychiatric detention, many for speech-related charges. The system imprisons children. It does not psychiatrically detain them. Whether this reflects a policy boundary or simply the age demographics of psychiatric commitments is not clear from the data. ### Gender 6 of 45 minors are female (13%). The youngest girl is Anna Zhuravleva (14, terrorism and terror financing). The second youngest is Eva Bagrova (16, terror recruitment). The adult dataset shows a similar gender split: women represent a minority of political prosecutions across all charge categories. The system's treatment of girls mirrors its treatment of women: present, but outnumbered. ### Maximum force on a child Ivan Astashin Age 17 (2009) · 7 charges · most charges stacked on any minor Articles 167 (property damage), 205 (terrorism), 205.2 (terror recruitment), 222 (weapons), 223 (weapons manufacturing), 280 (extremist calls), 282 (inciting hatred). Seven articles simultaneously on a 17-year-old. This is the maximum force the system applied to any child in the dataset. He was re-prosecuted in 2024 at age 32\. He is now 34, still imprisoned. 17 years. across the boundary ## Prosecuted as a child. Prosecuted again as an *adult.* Two individuals in the dataset were prosecuted as minors and then prosecuted again after turning 18\. The system followed them across the age boundary. Nikita Uvarov First prosecuted age 15 (2020) · Prosecuted again 2026 · Now approximately 21 Charged with terror training (Art. 205.3) at age 15\. Prosecuted again as an adult in 2026, weeks before his original sentence was due to expire. Six years in the system. Ivan Astashin First prosecuted age 17 (2009) · Prosecuted again 2024 · Now approximately 34 Charged at 17 with 7 articles simultaneously (Art. 167, 205, 205.2, 222, 223, 280, 282): the most charges stacked on any minor in the dataset. Prosecuted again 15 years later in 2024\. He entered the system as a child. He is still in it at 34. Two children prosecuted as minors were prosecuted again as adults. In both cases, new charges were filed as the original sentence approached completion. The system did not close the file when the sentence ended. still inside ## Entered as children. Still *imprisoned.* 12 of the approximately 45 persons prosecuted as minors are currently imprisoned according to the OVD-Info dataset. 36 are not. Two of the imprisoned have been inside for 17 years. Grigory Lebedev Charged age 16 (2009) · Now approximately 33 · 17 years Entered the system at 16\. Approximately 17 years in detention. Ivan Astashin Charged age 17 (2009) · Now approximately 34 · 17 years Seven charges at 17\. Re-prosecuted in 2024\. Still inside. Gleb Koryakin Charged age 15 (2018) · Now approximately 23 · 8 years Charged with terror facilitation (Art. 205.1) at 15\. Faces 3 simultaneous ICCPR violations (Articles 14, 18, 22). Eight years inside. 12 of \~45 persons prosecuted as minors: currently imprisoned. 36 not currently imprisoned. Status from OVD-Info CSV field. Longest held: Grigory Lebedev (17 years, entered age 16) and Ivan Astashin (17 years, entered age 17). 6 girls, 39 boys. 5 facing 3+ simultaneous ICCPR violations. Youngest: Anna Zhuravleva, age 14 (2023), terrorism + terror financing. Released June 2025\. the system ## The system shows no juvenile procedural *distinctions.* Every Criminal Code article used on a child is also used on adults. No high-frequency adult charge is withheld from minors. The charge distribution for children overrepresents terrorism articles (Art. 205: 9.2% for minors vs 2.4% for adults), vandalism (Art. 214: 10.5% vs 1.6%), and weapons charges (Art. 222.1: 6.6% vs 1.3%). Children are not prosecuted less severely. They are prosecuted differently: more terrorism, more weapons, more vandalism. Two interpretations, same dataThe data is consistent with two readings. The first: the system was designed without age differentiation because political prosecution of children is a feature, not an oversight. The ratchet does not check age because checking age would reduce its effectiveness. The second: the Criminal Code was not designed for political prosecution of children because it is a relatively new phenomenon (73% of cases are post-2022). The system lacks a juvenile mode not because it was designed to crush children, but because the legal infrastructure has not caught up with a practice that barely existed before the invasion. Both readings fit the data. This report documents the structural patterns. It does not claim to know which interpretation is correct. CHARGE OVERREPRESENTATION: CHILDREN vs ADULTS (% OF TOTAL CHARGES) 354.1 15.8% 2.7% +13.3pp 205 9.2% 2.4% +7.7pp 214 10.5% 1.6% +7.1pp 222.1 6.6% 1.3% +6.0pp 223.1 5.3% 0.6% +5.2pp Children Adults Fig. 6 Five articles are overrepresented in child prosecutions relative to adults. Art. 354.1 (rehabilitation of Nazism) appears at 15.8% for minors vs 2.7% for adults. However, the minor numerator is 12 cases: a single case added or removed changes the percentage by 1.3 points. These proportions are directional indicators from a small sample, not population-level statistics. SKOS charge-to-ICCPR mappings are analyst judgments. The Russian criminal prosecution system does not have a juvenile mode. Every Criminal Code article used on a child is also used on adults. No high-frequency adult charge is withheld from minors. The structural analysis finds system-level patterns in the data. The case profiles reveal individual decisions by specific FSB agents (fabricating evidence, threatening rape, reclassifying hooliganism as terrorism). Both are documented here. Both matter. Whether this reflects design or omission, the outcome is the same: children are processed through the same machinery as adults. where ## St. Petersburg prosecutes children at 3.5x the *adult rate.* 36 of 48 child prosecutions have location data. Half are concentrated in three cities: Moscow (8), St. Petersburg (7), and Ulan-Ude (3). But the raw counts obscure the real finding: some cities prosecute children at dramatically higher rates relative to their adult prosecution volume. CHILD PROSECUTIONS BY CITY (CIRCLE SIZE = COUNT) 8 Moscow 7 St. Petersburg 3 Ulan-Ude 3 Kansk 2 Feodosia (Crimea) 2 Chita 2 Kazan Yekaterinburg Omsk Khabarovsk Nevinnomyssk Stavropol Russia Occupied territory 12 prosecutions have no location data Fig. 7 Geographic distribution of child prosecutions. Moscow and St. Petersburg account for half of all geolocated cases. Feodosia (occupied Crimea, shown in gold) has 2 child prosecutions despite being largely invisible to monitoring organizations. The eastern cluster (Kansk, Ulan-Ude, Chita) reflects FSB regional offices in Siberia and the Russian Far East. OVERREPRESENTATION: CHILD % vs ADULT % OF PROSECUTIONS BY CITY St. Petersburg 19.4% 5.5% +13.9pp (3.5x) Kansk 8.3% 0.1% +8.2pp (83x) Ulan-Ude 8.3% 0.3% +8.0pp (28x) Feodosia 5.6% 0.1% Occupied Crimea (56x) Children Adults Fig. 8 Cities where children are prosecuted at disproportionate rates relative to adults. These ratios are directional indicators from a small sample (n=36 geolocated cases), not population-level statistics. Kansk's 83x figure reflects a single case with three co-defendants (the Minecraft case). St. Petersburg's 3.5x (7 children) is more robust. Feodosia (occupied Crimea) has 2 child prosecutions despite near-total monitoring blackout. charged together ## A 17-year-old charged alongside adults aged *35 to 77.* 17 probable co-defendant groups in the dataset contain both minors and adults charged under the same articles in the same year and location. These groups are identified by proxy matching (same year, same location, same charge combination), not by confirmed case identifiers. The ontology contains a \`partOfCase\` property, but the proxy matching provides broader coverage. Some of these groups may represent separate cases that happen to share characteristics. ICCPR Art. 10(2)(b) requires that accused juvenile persons be separated from adults. In the confirmed cases (Uvarov/Mikhailenko/Andreyev from journalism; Astashin/Lebedev from case linkage), children were charged together with adults in the same proceedings. | Year | Location | Charge | Child | Oldest co-defendant | Age gap | | ---- | ------------- | ------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------- | -------- | | 2025 | (unknown) | Art. 282.2 (extremist org) | age 17 | Amaliia Malchugova, age 77 | 60 years | | 2017 | Moscow | Art. 318 (violence against official) | Mikhail Galyashkin, age 17 | Vyacheslav Shatrovsky, age 48 | 31 years | | 2009 | Moscow | Art. 205 (terrorism) | Grigory Lebedev, age 16 | Maxim Ivanov, age 20 | 4 years | | 2019 | Yekaterinburg | Art. 212 (mass riots) | Sergey Potapov, age 17 | Konstantin Kabanov, age 29 | 12 years | | 2024 | (unknown) | Art. 354.1 (rehabilitation of Nazism) | Unknown male 200 (16), Unknown male 199 (17) | Dmitry Chemerigin, age 46 | 30 years | In the most extreme case, a 17-year-old was charged under Art. 282.2 (participation in an extremist organization) in the same case as 26 adults, the oldest of whom was 77\. The system placed a child in the same legal proceeding as adults more than four times his age. This is a documented Art. 10(2)(b) violation: the child was not separated from adults. non-derogable rights violations ## 6 children charged under statutes that violate rights Russia *cannot suspend.* ICCPR Art. 4(2) lists rights that cannot be derogated even in a state of emergency, even during war, even under martial law. Art. 18 (freedom of thought, conscience, and religion) is on that list. Six child prosecutions involve charges that, as applied, violate Art. 18\. The distinction between "as written" and "as applied" matters: Art. 205.5 as written criminalizes terror financing, but when applied to Jehovah's Witnesses for religious donations (as it was for Koryakin, Turbin, and Zaitsev), it functions as a restriction on freedom of conscience. Art. 148 (insulting religious feelings, applied to Kurdov) more directly implicates Art. 18 as written. The SKOS mappings that connect these charges to Art. 18 are analyst judgments. The treaty text is not. | Name | Age | Year | Charges | Non-derogable right | | ---------------- | --- | ---- | ------------------------------------ | -------------------- | | Anna Zhuravleva | 14 | 2023 | 105 (murder/attempted murder), 205.5 | Art. 18 (conscience) | | Gleb Koryakin | 15 | 2018 | 205.1, 205.5, 222.1, 223.1 | Art. 18 (conscience) | | Arseniy Turbin | 15 | 2023 | 205.5 | Art. 18 (conscience) | | Valery Zaitsev | 15 | 2023 | 205.3, 205.5 | Art. 18 (conscience) | | Unknown male 274 | 17 | 2025 | 282.2 | Art. 18 (conscience) | | Andrei Kurdov | 17 | 2021 | 148 | Art. 18 (conscience) | Why this matters legallyUnder ICCPR Art. 4(1), states may derogate from certain rights "in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation." Russia has invoked its security environment to justify expanded criminal prosecution. But Art. 4(2) explicitly prohibits derogation from Art. 18\. There is no emergency exception. There is no wartime exception. A state cannot suspend freedom of conscience for anyone, at any age, under any circumstances. These six children were charged under statutes that violate a right Russia ratified as absolute. The SKOS mappings that connect these charges to Art. 18 are analyst judgments, but the treaty text is not. unmapped procedural violations ## Every child prosecution violates 4 ICCPR articles the ontology *wasn't counting.* The ontology maps each Criminal Code article to the ICCPR provisions it violates. But it does not map the fact of being a child to ICCPR Art. 24 (rights of the child), Art. 10(2)(b) (juvenile separation), Art. 10(3) (juvenile treatment), or Art. 14(4) (juvenile procedure). These four articles apply to every child prosecution, but the violation is not automatic: it depends on whether Russia's treatment of these specific children fails to meet the articles' requirements. The evidence from this dataset and from published journalism suggests systemic failure on all four: **Art. 10(2)(b) (juvenile separation):** 17 probable co-defendant groups contain both minors and adults. Turbin was beaten by adult cellmates. Balazeikin was housed with a former Wagner mercenary who threatened to kill him. **Art. 10(3) (juvenile treatment):** Turbin lost 17 kilograms in detention. Zhuravleva was bullied by cellmates and transferred to a psychiatric hospital. A torture case was opened. Balazeikin is being denied medication for autoimmune hepatitis. **Art. 14(4) (juvenile procedure):** Uvarov, Balazeikin, and Turbin were tried by military courts, not civilian juvenile courts. Hearings were closed. FSB agents fabricated evidence against Turbin (per Mediazona). Confessions from Uvarov's co-defendants were described as extracted "under pressure and threats." **Art. 24 (rights of the child):** The state classified children as young as 14 as terrorists, placed them on the federal terrorist registry, and applied the same Criminal Code articles used on adults without age-appropriate differentiation. ICCPR VIOLATION COUNT: BEFORE AND AFTER ART. 24 EXTENSION Without Art. 24 Art.19: 22 Art.14: 7 Art.18: 6 Art.22: 5 Art.21: 1 3+ violations: 5 children \+ Art.24, 10(2b), 10(3), 14(4) With Art. 24 Art.24: 45 Art.10(2b): 45 Art.10(3): 45 Art.14(4): 45 Art.19: 22 +3 more All 45 children face 4+ simultaneous ICCPR violations. 5 face 7+ violations. Art. 24 violations are supported by documented evidence of specific failures (see above). Fig. 9 The OWL extension adds Art. 24, 10(2)(b), 10(3), and 14(4) to every child prosecution. These are not charge-dependent: they apply because the defendant is a child. The ontology now counts them. Every child faces at least 4 violations. Five face 7. 48 prosecutions. \~45 children. 12 currently imprisoned. The youngest was 14\. Two have been inside for 17 years. 33 were prosecuted after the invasion. The system applied new wartime statutes to children within months of enactment. Two were re-prosecuted as adults. And 48 prosecutions captures only a fraction of the reality. From the OVD-Info dataset. Data: OVD-Info political prosecution database, 7,132 records, public export. Method: SPARQL queries on 217,814 RDF triples (BFO-aligned OWL ontology with ICCPR-mapped SKOS vocabulary). ICCPR mappings are analyst judgments, not legally reviewed. The SKOS vocabulary does not natively distinguish "as written" from "as applied" incompatibility. All mappings are stored as skos:related links from Criminal Code article to ICCPR provision. The "as written" vs "as applied" distinction noted in the report is downstream editorial annotation, not a property in the ontology. A future version of the SKOS vocabulary could encode this distinction as separate relation types (e.g., skos:faciallyIncompatible vs skos:incompatibleAsApplied). Published reports: [traceoriginresearch.com](https://www.traceoriginresearch.com/) [Read Part V: Five Systems, One Century →](https://www.traceoriginresearch.com/what-a-knowledge-graph-found-across-five-authoritarian-systems-one-million-soviet-records-and-the-six-categories-of-political-prosecution-that-keep-coming-back/) Peer review: OVD-Info data and legal team (September 2026). © 2026 Trace Origin LLC