The Suppliers Sanctions Don’t Reach: A Russian Missile Plant, Warship Yard and Tank Factory Signed for Machines After US and European Sanctions, Through Dealers Those Sanctions Do Not Cover
The Suppliers Sanctions Don't Reach
Contracts between Russian companies, read from a public register. No allegation of unlawful conduct by any named company. Full legal notice.
In 2023 a Russian missile factory, blocked by the United States and listed by the European Union, signed a contract for two precision measuring machines of a California company's brand. The seller was a Russian dealer that no Western government had listed. Western asset freezes bind the West's own people, companies and money. They do not bind one Russian company selling to another inside Russia; only US export rules reach that far, and in practice rarely.
On 5 September 2023 the Votkinsk Plant signed a contract for two precision measuring machines. It was a small purchase for a large place.
Few factories matter more to Russia's armed forces. Ironworks have stood at Votkinsk, a town about 600 miles east of Moscow where the land begins to rise toward the Ural Mountains, since 1759, and over two and a half centuries the works there have made, in turn, iron, boats, steam locomotives, farm machinery and guns. The joint-stock company that signed the 2023 contract, registered in 2010, is the latest of the institutions to run them. Today the plant is one of Russia's key makers of solid-fuel ballistic missiles. There is the Yars, an intercontinental missile that carries nuclear warheads. There is the Bulava, the nuclear missile carried by Russia's newest submarines. There is the Iskander, a short-range missile Russia has fired at Ukraine throughout the full-scale invasion. And there is, Ukraine's military intelligence says, a section of the Kinzhal, the air-launched missile used against Ukrainian cities. In American terms, it is as if one factory built the Minuteman land-based nuclear missile, the Navy's Trident submarine missile and the Army's battlefield missiles, all under one name. (Russia's land-based nuclear missiles belong to a separate service, the Strategic Rocket Forces.)
The war has made the company bigger. It employs more than 12,000 people, about 2,500 of them hired since the full-scale invasion, and its managers say it has bought some 7,000 pieces of new equipment, according to the Kyiv Independent. The same newspaper reported estimates, from sources it did not name, that the plant's output of Iskanders nearly tripled, from about 250 in 2023 to about 700 in 2024. In February 2026, according to Ukrainian officials quoted by Interfax-Ukraine, Ukraine struck the site with long-range cruise missiles. A plant growing this fast needs machines, and what it makes needs measuring.
The contract names the machines: Micro-Vu Vertex 341s. They check finished parts with cameras, to within thousandths of a millimetre, so that each part matches its drawing. Micro-Vu is a company in Windsor, California, among the vineyards of Sonoma County, which has made measuring equipment since 1959; its distributors say its machines are built there. Nothing in the records suggests that Micro-Vu sold to the dealer or knew where its machines went; how these two reached Russia, and where they were built, the records do not say. The two units and their installation cost 29.0 million rubles, about $300,000 at the time. By then the EU had listed the plant for nine months, the US Treasury had blocked it since February 2023, and it had been on the US Commerce Department's Entity List since June 2022. The seller was a Russian dealer that no Western government has listed. The whole transaction sits in Russia's own public record of government purchases, which anyone outside Russia can read through a mirror.
In that record a Russian company is identified by its ten-digit tax number, much as an American business is by its federal Employer Identification Number. The buyer on the contract carries the number 1828020110, and the same ten digits are printed in the EU's listing entry for the Votkinsk Plant. It is not a company with a similar name, or a subsidiary at one remove. It is the listed legal person, contracting in its own name, in a public register. This report matches on those numbers, never on names.
The dealer is where this report looks. For more than a decade the United States and its allies have built sanctions against Russia's arms industry, layer on layer, and all of them work through people, goods and money under the sanctioning government's own law. A listing (an asset freeze in Europe, “blocking” in the United States) tells Europeans or Americans, and anyone doing business on their territory, not to deal with the listed company; nothing happens to the company's property in Russia. An export ban tells Western exporters what they may not ship. Neither forbids one Russian company from selling to another inside Russia. US export rules are the exception, in law: they follow items that are subject to them wherever the items go, which includes many American-made goods and some foreign-made goods with American content, and since May 2023 they have required a US licence to transfer any such measuring instrument within Russia. Whether these two machines were subject to those rules depends on where and how they were made. And a rule that reaches a Russian dealer in law reaches it in practice only if the dealer has something in the West to lose. What Western governments can do is list the dealer, which cuts it off from Western suppliers and banks. Russia's purchase records show those dealers at work. Counted strictly, they record 7 contracts signed by arms makers the EU had already frozen, through 6 dealers. Three of those dealers are on no Western list.
The register shows contracts: who signed, when, for what and at what price. The mirror through which it can be read from abroad does not show whether a contract was carried out, where a machine was built, or how it reached the seller, and for most contracts the brand is the attribution of Ukraine's military intelligence agency, known as GUR, not the contract's. Those limits hold for everything below; they are set out in full under Limits, and not repeated at every step.
None of this was hidden, and none of it is a discovery in the ordinary sense. Like the US government's own spending websites, Russia's procurement register publishes state contracts by law; from outside Russia it can be read only through a third-party mirror. GUR had already cited most of these contracts as evidence that the machines were in the plants. What had not been done was to read the contracts against the dated sanctions lists, by tax number, in the right order.
Listed arms makers kept signing for machines, mostly through dealers on no list
Votkinsk makes missiles for the Iskander system, according to the EU, which listed it on 16 December 2022; the US Commerce Department had put it on the Entity List in June 2022, and the US Treasury blocked it on 24 February 2023. GUR ties it to the Kinzhal. The Micro-Vu contract came about 9 months after the EU listing. The machines were bought, the contract says, to re-equip an assembly line for the serial production of something it calls only product Zh80. It does not say what Zh80 is. The seller, Impex Kraft LLC, appears on no list checked.
The Yantar shipyard in Kaliningrad, Russia's Baltic outpost between Poland and Lithuania, builds ships for the Russian navy. Under US law it had been blocked since 29 July 2014, when the US blocked its majority owner, the United Shipbuilding Corporation; OFAC's 50 percent rule extends a blocking to companies that blocked persons own by half or more, and on the corporation's 2013 and Yantar's 2020 reports its stake was well above that. On 7 April 2022, six weeks into the full-scale invasion, the US Treasury designated Yantar in its own name; on 8 April the EU listed it, citing the landing ship Pyotr Morgunov, a vessel for putting troops and armour ashore, which Yantar built and Russia used in the war. On 2 June, a buyer with Yantar's tax number, 3900000111, the number in both entries, signed for a five-axis vertical milling centre: a machine whose cutting head can approach a part from almost any angle, used for complex curved parts such as propellers and turbine blades. The contract, for the machine with installation and training, was worth 60.8 million rubles, about $1.05 million. GUR identifies the machine as a KREOS 270, a model of Fagima, an Italian machine-tool company.
The contract asked for more than a machine. It asked for it to be installed, brought into service, and for the shipyard's own specialists to be taught how to run and maintain it. The contract does not name who would do that work; the seller, a Russian company, was responsible for it. That matters in law: EU rules follow EU nationals wherever they work, so the nationality of an installer would bring the service within them or keep it out. So would the route. A machine sold from St Petersburg reaches Kaliningrad by sea or overland across Lithuania, and an overland leg could bring the sale within EU rules, in the weeks when EU transit to Kaliningrad was itself in dispute. Neither appears in the records. That seller, Kaurus Alliance LLC of St Petersburg, appears on none of the sanctions lists of the eight Western governments checked (the US, EU, UK, Switzerland, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), as of 15 November 2026.
Two other listed buyers kept buying, from Chinese brands. Uralvagonzavod, Russia's main tank factory, signed in April 2023 for a Weihai radial drill through Oilfield Equipment Plant LLC, a company in Bashkortostan on no list; NPO Impuls, a St Petersburg defence firm, signed in August 2024 for two Ningbo Blin milling centres through MetallMash LLC, which the US Treasury had blocked in December 2023, the one case here in which the dealer was already listed. Neither purchase touches Western law in the records; both are counted because the buyer was listed.
Counted strictly, with the buyer matched by the tax number in its listing entry, the contract matched by the number GUR itself cites, and a listing with an official date, the register shows 7 contracts signed after the EU had frozen the buyer's assets. Each also came after a US blocking of the same buyer. In only one, the Impuls purchase, was the dealer already on a Western list when it signed; three went through dealers on no Western list even today. Indexed to US blocking dates, collected for these five buyers only, the count is at least 28: the same 7, 20 Uralvagonzavod contracts signed between November 2016 and January 2020, after the US blocked the tank maker and before Britain and the EU froze it, and one Yantar contract, from 2017. The 2014 US entry gave no tax number; it named Uralvagonzavod at the Nizhny Tagil address of the company that signed these contracts, and today's entry prints that company's number. Those 21 contracts name 15 dealers, 12 of them on no Western list today. US blocking binds Americans, not Russian dealers, so this larger number shows that listed buyers kept buying; it says nothing more about Western reach than the 7 do. There is no clean "before" to compare with: of the purchase contracts in the data for these five buyers, none predates every Western listing of its buyer. The table reconciles the counts.
| Buyer | Before any freeze or blocking | After US blocking only | After an EU freeze |
|---|---|---|---|
| Almaz-Antey | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Yantar | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Uralvagonzavod | 0 | 20 +8 by model search | 1 |
| Votkinsk Plant | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| NPO Impuls | 0 | 0 | 1 |
Purchase contracts matched with confidence to machines GUR attributes to each buyer. Plain figures: matched by the contract number GUR cites (the counted contracts). "By model search": matched by model, plant and date, and not counted. One contract with a wrong GUR evidence link is excluded. "After US blocking only" means after a US blocking and before any EU freeze. "Listing" here means an asset freeze or blocking; export-control listings and the EU's 2014 financing restrictions are not counted, and counting them would move no row.
One more post-invasion purchase, a waterjet cutter (a machine that cuts metal with a jet of water carrying abrasive grit) attributed to the Czech maker PTV, contracted to the Strategic Control Points Corporation in December 2023 for 29.5 million rubles (about $323,000), went through an unlisted dealer too, but no dated listing of that buyer appears in the data, so it is not counted.
The EU listing (Council Regulation 269/2014) binds, under Article 17, EU nationals wherever they are, EU companies, and any business done in whole or in part within the EU; the US blocking binds US persons and property in US jurisdiction. A sale between two Russian companies, inside Russia, is outside both, unless part of the business touched them: an import from the EU, a payment through a Western bank, an EU national doing the installation. Upstream, Article 2(2) forbids making resources available to a listed company "directly or indirectly", and Article 9 forbids knowingly taking part in circumvention, so a European supplier who knew where a dealer's machine was going would be within the law even if the dealer is not. Whether any of that happened is not in the records. The manufacturers' serial-number and shipping records could show it. Under Russian law, which governs the contracts themselves, they were ordinary state contracts; when this report says a sale is beyond a measure's reach, it describes the sanctioning government's law, not the sale's legality.
The same kind of transaction, a decade earlier
None of this began with the full-scale invasion. On 16 July 2014 the US Treasury designated Almaz-Antey, the Russian government-owned arms maker that builds the Buk surface-to-air missile, under Executive Order 13661, blocking its property within US jurisdiction and barring Americans from dealing with it. The same day it blocked Uralvagonzavod, the tank maker. On 30 July the EU listed Almaz-Antey under Regulation 269/2014.
Eighteen months after the EU listing, on 10 February 2016, a Russian dealer signed a contract with Almaz-Antey. The buyer's tax number was 7731084175, the same ten digits as in the EU's listing entry for Almaz-Antey. (The 2014 US entry gave no tax number; it named Almaz-Antey at its Moscow address.) In 2015 the company had changed its name, from an "air defence" concern to an "aerospace defence" concern; the number did not change, which is why this report matches on numbers, not names. Almaz-Antey is a holding company with dozens of subsidiaries, and this contract was signed by the parent itself. The goods were two computer-controlled turning-milling centres, machines that shape metal both by spinning a part against a cutting blade and by cutting it with rotating tools, so that a complex part can be made in one setup. They cost 60.9 million rubles, about $789,000 at the time. GUR later attributed the machines to Almaz-Antey and named their maker: EMCO, of Hallein, Austria, near Salzburg.
Two more contracts followed. In August 2017, one machining centre, a computer-controlled milling machine that changes its own cutting tools, for 20.4 million rubles (about $343,000). GUR attributes this machine too to EMCO. Both EMCO contracts were with Unimatik LLC, a dealer based in the Sverdlovsk region in the Urals, the mountains that divide European Russia from Siberia, where arms have been made since the eighteenth century and far more of them since Soviet factories were evacuated east in 1941. In November 2017, two computer-controlled vertical lathes, giant turntables that spin large round parts against a cutter. GUR calls the machine an "SPV 60 turning machining centre" and attributes it to TOS Čelákovice, a machine-tool maker near Prague; the contract says only "CNC vertical lathe". Several Czech firms descended from the old state machine-tool combine use the TOS name, and vertical lathes are more typical of another of them, so this attribution is the least certain in the report. The contract was worth 156.4 million rubles (about $2.65 million), from KR Prom LLC of Moscow. In all, about $3.8 million at the exchange rates of the day, all in the buyer's own name. GUR lists Almaz-Antey among the makers of the RM-48U, a missile built from the 48N6 family of air-defence missiles used in the S-300 and S-400 systems, first as a target for air-defence training and, according to GUR as reported by Militarnyi, now fired at ground targets in Ukraine.
Unimatik went on trading. The United States put it on the Treasury's sanctions list in 2024 and Britain froze its assets the same year, but American and British sanctions do not stop a Russian company selling to Russian customers: its public contracts with Russian state buyers continue into July 2025. The EU froze its assets on 23 April 2026, more than ten years after its first contract with Almaz-Antey. The EU's reasons named Almaz-Antey among its customers, and rested on a listing criterion, support for Russia's military and industrial complex, that the EU adopted in February 2025. KR Prom has never been frozen by the EU. In October 2025 it was added to the EU's export-control list, which limits what European exporters may sell to it, a measure that had existed since 2014.
| Dealer | First contract with listed Almaz-Antey | US | UK | EU | Switzerland |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unimatik LLC INN 6672197493 | 10 Feb 2016 | Treasury sanctions list; first seen 1 May 2024 | asset freeze, 7 Nov 2024 | asset freeze, 23 Apr 2026 (10.2 years after the first contract) | listed 22 May 2026, measure not stated in data |
| KR Prom LLC INN 7722216040 | 10 Nov 2017 | not listed | not listed | export controls (Annex IV), 24 Oct 2025 (8.0 years after); assets not frozen | listed 12 Dec 2025, measure not stated in data |
The contracts sat in the public register for ten years before the EU froze Unimatik's assets in April 2026. Listing cut the dealer off from Western suppliers and money; it did not stop it selling inside Russia, as Unimatik's contracts after its American and British listings show. The law changed in between: in 2016 the EU had targeted listings and controls on dual-use goods; since 2022 it has banned whole categories of exports, required no-Russia resale clauses, and listed Russian machine-tool distributors as a matter of course. What continues across the decade is the shape of the transaction, not the legal gap around it.
Sanctioned companies must now hide their corporate purchases. These contracts fall under a different law.
On 6 March 2022, ten days into the full-scale invasion, the Russian government issued Resolution No. 301 under the corporate-procurement law, 223-FZ. Companies under foreign sanctions must keep their corporate purchases, and the suppliers they buy from, out of the public register. Russia's Ministry of Finance, in its letter of 14 March 2022 (No. 24-03-08/18813), says the resolution was issued to implement Article 4(16) of 223-FZ and that non-publication is mandatory; that letter does not mention 44-FZ. The legal database Garant reports that a later ministry letter states the resolution does not extend to relations governed by 44-FZ. Every contract counted here was concluded under 44-FZ, which Resolution 301 does not govern. This report found no 44-FZ counterpart allowing sanctioned buyers to withhold open contracts, though it did not establish that none exists. A buyer under 44-FZ does choose, within legal grounds, between open and closed procurement methods, so publication may still reflect a decision made at that earlier stage. What the register no longer shows is mainly the corporate purchasing of sanctioned companies since 2022, and their classified defence contracts at any time. Those cannot be counted, and may not resemble what can.
Since July 2014, when the first buyer in this dataset was listed, 86 purchase contracts name 61 dealers. The contracts are for machines that GUR attributes to these plants, of brands headquartered in the West or Japan, so the population is GUR's selection, not a sample of the market. Of those dealers, 47 are on no Western list today. Most have no contract in the mirror of the public register since 2021 (35 of them). They may have stopped trading; their customers may have moved purchases into the closed corporate system; or the mirror may have lost coverage after 2022, when access to the official system from abroad was cut. A check of the mirror's monthly coverage against official totals could not be run: the mirror now blocks automated access. Until it is, the absence cannot be read. 12 of them have signed some public contract since 2022, with any buyer and for any goods; that shows they still trade in the open, not what they now sell. Across all the data, a wider population than that, at least 4 dealers on no Western list signed public contracts after the EU or Britain had frozen the buyer's assets: Kaurus Alliance with Yantar, Impex Kraft with Votkinsk, Oilfield Equipment Plant with Uralvagonzavod (a Chinese-branded drill), and a St Petersburg laboratory-equipment dealer that signed to sell a part for an electron microscope to a listed Russian Academy of Sciences physics institute in 2024, a sale found in that dealer's own contracts rather than through GUR.
A list in the open
Stated precisely, the gap has two parts. In law, European measures do not apply to a sale between two Russian firms in Russia at all, and US blocking does not either unless a US person, US property or the US financial system is involved. In practice, US export rules do apply to items subject to them wherever those items are, including transfers inside Russia, but they have little hold on a Russian dealer with no Western business. What Western measures do reach is the step before the last one. A European supplier may not make resources available to a listed buyer indirectly, or knowingly help get around a listing; since March 2024 EU exporters must bar resale to Russia in their contracts with buyers in most countries outside the EU; EU parent companies must use their best efforts to keep foreign subsidiaries in line; since December 2023 foreign banks that serve Russia's military industry risk losing access to the American financial system. And the dealer itself can be listed, which cuts it off from Western suppliers and money: the US has listed Russian machine-tool distributors, Unimatik and MetallMash among them. The register shows the other end of that step, which dealers signed with listed arms makers and which of them no one has listed. That is where the evidence points the measures that do reach. Whether those measures have been used against such dealers can be tested against enforcement records; this report does not test it.
The register is a window Russia has already closed once, for sanctioned companies buying under one of its procurement laws, and could close further. While it stays open it shows, by name and tax number, which Russian dealers signed with arms makers that Western governments had already listed. Of the 6 dealers on the 7 contracts counted here, 3 are on no Western list. This report names only the dealers in the contracts it counts. Whether to look further, and whether to act, is for governments.
How repairs were separated from purchases
GUR often proves a machine's presence with a procurement record. Matching those records to the contracts showed that many are repair or service contracts. These prove a machine was in a plant but not that it was bought then. Only purchase contracts are used here.
The test is written as a formal rule over the graph, a SHACL-SPARQL rule. Each restriction is its own object, with the issuing government, the measure, its legal basis, a start date and, where one exists, an end date, the kind of date and its primary source. A government's listing and a blocking that follows by law from a parent's listing are kept as different kinds of restriction: Yantar's 2014 US blocking is recorded as derived from the United Shipbuilding Corporation's listing, with the dated ownership stakes it rests on, not as a designation of Yantar. No company is marked "frozen". The rule asks whether a contract classified as a purchase was signed while an asset freeze or blocking of the buyer was in force, and reports which restriction, the identity assertion linking the buyer to the listed company, and the contract it came from. The model keeps apart the facility where a machine stands, the legal person that buys it, the role of seller in a contract, the brand, the product model, the manufacturer's headquarters, the country of origin (unknown here), GUR's attribution, and the law governing the contract. For EU asset freezes it returns eight contracts; one is excluded because GUR's evidence link is wrong (see Limits). The seven were each checked by hand against the contract text in the mirror. US blocking dates were added from primary sources. The rule does not use the brand or its headquarters country at all, because a brand's headquarters says nothing about which law governed a sale; in the graph the brand is recorded as GUR's attribution, not as the maker. Dates that merely mark when a data service began covering a list are typed as such and never enter the rule. The shapes and the rule are reproduced in the annex.
A related population
A different population tells a related story. Among the 1,457 trading and technology firms outside Russia, mostly in China, the United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong and Turkey, that GUR lists as already sanctioned somewhere, 63% appear on US lists and on no other government's. That figure combines asset freezes and export-control listings, and because GUR's list starts from firms already sanctioned, it measures how often other governments list the same firms, not who listed first or the size of the network.
Sources and definitions
No single source shows that a contract went to a company already under sanctions. That appears only when the sources are joined, the buyer is matched by tax number, and the events are read in time order.
| Source | What it gives | Records |
|---|---|---|
| GUR, War&Sanctions, "Tools of war" | Foreign machine tools GUR attributes to Russian arms plants: make, model, the manufacturer's headquarters country, plant, weapons made there, and the evidence (often a procurement record) | 1,610 |
| GUR, "Components in weapons" | Foreign parts recovered from Russian weapons | 6,367 |
| Russian procurement register, as mirrored by clearspending.ru | Contract date, subject, quantity, price, buyer and seller with tax numbers | 489 matched |
| Official sanctions lists via OpenSanctions; EU Official Journal; US Federal Register and Code of Federal Regulations | US, EU, UK, Japan, Canada, Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand: who is listed, when, under which measure, with which identifiers and stated grounds | 8 jurisdictions |
What these findings do not establish
- That the contracts were carried out. The records show contracts signed. The official register records execution and acceptance; the mirror does not carry those records, and the official register cannot be read from outside Russia. The limit belongs to the mirror, not to the register.
- Where or when the machines were built, or when they left the country of their maker. GUR records the manufacturer's headquarters country, which is not the country of origin. Russian rules require the register to record the country of origin of contracted goods; the mirror does not carry that field. A dealer may have sold stock imported before a listing, or a machine built elsewhere. Serial numbers would settle build dates, origin and first buyers.
- Wrongdoing by any manufacturer or dealer. See the legal notice. The test identifies a pattern; it does not apply the law that governs the sale.
- That the contracted goods are the machines GUR identifies. All seven counted contracts were matched by the contract number GUR itself cites. For Votkinsk and Uralvagonzavod the contract names the model; for the others the contract gives only the type and quantity, and the brand is GUR's attribution, not checked against the contracts' technical annexes. The Micro-Vu Vertex 341 is a model in Micro-Vu's catalogue. The "SPV 60" that GUR attributes to TOS Čelákovice was not found in that firm's published lathe range, and the contract calls the machine a CNC vertical lathe, a type more associated with another TOS successor firm.
- The full picture. Only contracts matched by the contract number GUR cites, with a tax-number match to the listing and an official listing date, are counted. US blocking dates come from OFAC notices and the Federal Register for the five counted buyers only; other buyers' US dates were not collected, so the US-indexed count is a lower bound.
- Who owned whom. Ownership is recorded as evidence, in dated stakes, but blockings that follow from a parent's listing are entered by hand, not inferred. That was done for Yantar: the United Shipbuilding Corporation and its subsidiary held about 71% of Yantar in 2013 (the corporation's annual report) and the corporation 92% at the end of 2020 (Yantar's annual report), so on the 2013 and 2020 figures Yantar was blocked under OFAC's 50 percent rule from 29 July 2014. The corporation held the 2013 stake directly and through a subsidiary it owned outright, so no aggregation across different blocked owners is needed. The graph records this as a blocking derived from the corporation's listing, with both stakes as evidence, not as a listing of Yantar. The stake is assumed continuous between the 2013 and 2020 reports; the 2017 Yantar contract depends on that. Ownership was not checked for the other buyers' contracts, or for the subsidiaries of Almaz-Antey.
- A representative market sample. The dealer figures come from contracts GUR chose to cite and that name a seller, which skews to ordinary state purchases and to years before 2022. The denominators inherit GUR's selection. Activity since 2022 is read from each dealer's most recent public contracts, and the mirror's coverage since 2022 was not checked against official totals, so counts are lower bounds and absences are not evidence.
- What the register no longer shows. Since March 2022 sanctioned companies must keep their corporate (223-FZ) purchases out of the public register, and classified defence contracts never appear in it. The 44-FZ contracts here were not within that rule. Whether any separate 44-FZ non-publication route for sanctioned buyers was created in 2022 was not established.
- That GUR's evidence links are right. One GUR record (1142, a KENT surface grinder at Uralvagonzavod) cites a contract that is for a different machine, a radial drill. That purchase is excluded.
- Whether a dealer still exists. A dealer with no public contract may still trade privately or may have closed. The Russian company register was not checked.
- Whether the 2016 to 2017 machines were controlled goods. EU dual-use controls on machine tools depend on each model's measured precision; the specifications were not checked.
- When the tax number entered the sanctions entry. The match uses the entries as they stand today. The 2014 US entries for Almaz-Antey and Uralvagonzavod printed no tax number; whether the 2014 EU entry did was not checked. The identity of the legal person holds either way, because tax numbers survive renaming. What a compliance screener could have matched at the time is a different question, and is not answered here.
- Independent verification. Every count was built and checked by the same author from the same data. No one outside Trace Origin has reproduced it.
Every purchase named in this report
| Signed | Maker and machine | Dealer | Buyer | Value (US$ at the time) | Buyer already listed at signing | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10 Feb 2016 | EMCO (HQ Austria) · Lathe MaXXturn 45SMY 2 units | Unimatik LLC INN 6672197493 | Joint-Stock Company Aerospace Defence Concern Almaz-Antey INN 7731084175 | RUB 60.9m about $789,000 | US blocking (E.O. 13661), 16 Jul 2014 EU asset freeze, 30 Jul 2014 | contract · GUR 1146 |
| 9 Aug 2017 | EMCO (HQ Austria) · Vertical machining centre EMCOMILL 750 1 unit | Unimatik LLC INN 6672197493 | Joint-Stock Company Aerospace Defence Concern Almaz-Antey INN 7731084175 | RUB 20.4m about $343,000 | US blocking (E.O. 13661), 16 Jul 2014 EU asset freeze, 30 Jul 2014 | contract · GUR 1159 |
| 10 Nov 2017 | TOS Čelákovice (HQ Czech Republic) · Turning machining centre SPV 60 2 units; contract: CNC vertical lathe | KR Prom LLC INN 7722216040 | Joint-Stock Company Aerospace Defence Concern Almaz-Antey INN 7731084175 | RUB 156.4m about $2.65 million | US blocking (E.O. 13661), 16 Jul 2014 EU asset freeze, 30 Jul 2014 | contract · GUR 1157 · GUR 1158 |
| 2 Jun 2022 | Fagima (HQ Italy) · Machining centre KREOS 270 1 unit, with installation and training | Kaurus Alliance LLC INN 7804392826 | Joint-Stock Company Baltic Shipyard Yantar INN 3900000111 | RUB 60.8m about $1.05 million | US blocking through its owner (50% rule), 29 Jul 2014 US designation in own name, 7 Apr 2022 EU asset freeze, 8 Apr 2022 | contract · GUR 1430 |
| 20 Apr 2023 | Weihai (HQ China) · Radial drilling machine Z30100 1 unit, with tooling and installation | Oilfield Equipment Plant LLC INN 0261045091 | Joint-Stock Company F. Dzerzhinsky Uralvagonzavod Research And Production Corporation INN 6623029538 | RUB 10.4m about $128,000 | US blocking (E.O. 13661), 16 Jul 2014 UK asset freeze, 24 Feb 2022 EU asset freeze, 15 Mar 2022 | contract · GUR 1140 |
| 5 Sep 2023 | Micro-Vu (HQ United States) · Measuring centre Vertex 341 2 units, with installation | Impex Kraft LLC INN 7717568632 | Joint-Stock Company Votkinsk Plant INN 1828020110 | RUB 29.0m about $300,000 | US blocking (E.O. 14024), 24 Feb 2023 EU asset freeze, 16 Dec 2022 | contract · GUR 1124 |
| 12 Aug 2024 | Ningbo Blin (HQ China) · Vertical milling centre BL-V11 · Vertical milling centre BL-V8 2 units, with installation | MetallMash LLC INN 9705075682 | Joint-Stock Company Scientific And Production Association Impuls INN 7804478424 | RUB 18.1m about $202,000 | US blocking (E.O. 14024), 12 Jun 2024 EU asset freeze, 25 Feb 2023 | contract · GUR 980 · GUR 981 |
| 11 Dec 2023 | PTV (HQ Czech Republic) · Waterjet cutting machine WJ3015-1Z-Unijet | Modern Machine-Building Company CJSC INN 7704506491 | Joint-Stock Company Corporation Strategic Control Points INN 7722775458 | RUB 29.5m about $323,000 | no dated listing of the buyer in the data | contract · GUR 1367 |
What readers ask
Did EMCO, TOS, Fagima or Micro-Vu break sanctions?
The records do not show that, and nothing here suggests it. They show Russian dealers signing contracts with Russian buyers inside Russia. How the machines reached the dealers, and when, is not in the records.
Didn't US law apply to the Votkinsk sale?
It depends on facts the records do not hold. Under US export rules, a transfer within Russia of a measuring instrument subject to those rules has required a US licence since May 2023, and any item subject to them needs one for an Entity List party such as Votkinsk. Whether these machines were subject to the rules depends on where and how they were produced, and a transfer happens on delivery, not on signature. The mirror shows neither origin nor delivery. US blocking of Votkinsk binds US persons, not a Russian seller.
Did the EU wait too long to list the dealers?
The decade is not a delay in any legal sense. EU listings are preventive measures, not punishments: a 2026 listing is not a verdict on a 2016 sale, and the interval measures how long these dealers' sales sat in a public register before any listing, not how long a decision took. Could the EU have listed them in 2016? Possibly, under the criteria then in force, but it was never tested. The EU eventually froze Unimatik's assets under a criterion adopted in 2025, and placed KR Prom under export controls, not a freeze. The report describes how long the sales were on the public record; it does not claim a delay against a duty the EU then had.
How do you know the buyer is the company the EU listed?
By tax number. The buyer on each counted contract carries the tax number printed in the listing entry: 7731084175 for Almaz-Antey, 3900000111 for Yantar, 1828020110 for Votkinsk.
What changes with US dates?
The compiled US list data carries no designation dates, so US dates were taken from the legal record. With dates from OFAC notices and the Federal Register, the US blocked Almaz-Antey and Uralvagonzavod on 16 July 2014, and Yantar through its owner two weeks later, so at least 21 more contracts fall after a US listing. The US blocking binds Americans; like the EU freeze, it did not forbid the Russian dealers' sales.
Hasn't the EU already banned these machines?
In stages. Machine tools were added to the EU's export bans from April 2022, and computer-controlled machine tools and their parts were restricted further in December 2023. Whether the specific machines here were covered on their dates of sale has not been established: the Yantar contract was signed in June 2022, and the Votkinsk machines are measuring machines, not machine tools. EU bans bind EU exporters; they do not reach a sale between two Russian companies in Russia.
Why rely on GUR?
GUR is a party to the war. Its records are used here for what they can be checked against: each machine's link to a public procurement contract, which is read directly. Makes and models remain GUR's attributions unless the contract names them. GUR also chose which contracts to cite, so every count built on its records inherits its selection.
Will this be updated?
The graph is refreshed as GUR publishes new records and governments add listings. Statuses such as "not listed" are as of 15 November 2026.
Terms used in this report
Companies and places
The shapes and the rule, as run
The full code and data are held privately. These are the parts a reader needs to check the method, copied unedited from the ontology file the pipeline runs (the first two lines summarise the class hierarchy): the shapes every restriction, derived blocking, ownership stake and identity assertion in the graph must satisfy (the graph conforms, with no violations), and the rule that finds contracts signed while a restriction was in force. The rule outputs no brand, maker or headquarters country. It does not compare tax numbers itself: identity assertions are made earlier in the pipeline, by matching the tax number on the contract with the numbers printed in the listing entry, and the rule reads them.
se:Listing rdfs:subClassOf se:Restriction .
se:DerivedBlocking rdfs:subClassOf se:Restriction . # never a Listing
se:RestrictionShape a sh:NodeShape ;
sh:targetClass se:Restriction ;
sh:property [ sh:path se:appliesTo ; sh:class se:Organisation ;
sh:minCount 1 ; sh:maxCount 1 ] ;
sh:property [ sh:path se:jurisdiction ; sh:minCount 1 ; sh:maxCount 1 ] ;
sh:property [ sh:path se:instrument ;
sh:in ( se:assetFreeze se:exportControl se:unspecified ) ;
sh:minCount 1 ] ;
sh:property [ sh:path se:validFrom ; sh:datatype xsd:date ;
sh:minCount 1 ; sh:maxCount 1 ] ;
sh:property [ sh:path se:validTo ; sh:datatype xsd:date ; sh:maxCount 1 ] ;
sh:property [ sh:path se:dateKind ;
sh:in ( se:officialDate se:firstSeenProxy se:derivedDate ) ;
sh:minCount 1 ; sh:maxCount 1 ] ;
sh:property [ sh:path prov:hadPrimarySource ; sh:minCount 1 ] .
se:DerivedBlockingShape a sh:NodeShape ;
sh:targetClass se:DerivedBlocking ;
sh:property [ sh:path se:derivedFrom ; sh:class se:Listing ; sh:minCount 1 ] ;
sh:property [ sh:path se:ownershipEvidence ; sh:class se:DatedStake ; sh:minCount 1 ] ;
sh:property [ sh:path se:dateKind ; sh:hasValue se:derivedDate ] ;
sh:sparql [
a sh:SPARQLConstraint ;
sh:prefixes se:Prefixes ;
sh:message """Derived blocking starts before its parent listing, or has no
50 percent stake held by the parent's listed person, dated on or before its start""" ;
sh:select """
SELECT $this WHERE {
$this se:derivedFrom ?parent ; se:validFrom ?from ;
se:appliesTo ?child .
?parent se:validFrom ?pFrom ; se:appliesTo ?holder .
FILTER ( ?from < ?pFrom ||
NOT EXISTS {
$this se:ownershipEvidence ?st .
?st se:holder ?holder ; se:held ?child ;
se:sharePercent ?pct ; se:asOf ?d .
FILTER (?pct >= 50 && ?d <= ?from)
} )
}""" ] .
se:DatedStakeShape a sh:NodeShape ;
sh:targetClass se:DatedStake ;
sh:property [ sh:path se:holder ; sh:minCount 1 ] ;
sh:property [ sh:path se:held ; sh:minCount 1 ] ;
sh:property [ sh:path se:sharePercent ; sh:datatype xsd:decimal ; sh:minCount 1 ] ;
sh:property [ sh:path se:asOf ; sh:datatype xsd:date ; sh:minCount 1 ] ;
sh:property [ sh:path prov:hadPrimarySource ; sh:minCount 1 ] .
se:IdentityAssertionShape a sh:NodeShape ;
sh:targetClass se:IdentityAssertion ;
sh:property [ sh:path se:recordEntity ; sh:minCount 1 ; sh:maxCount 1 ] ;
sh:property [ sh:path se:legalPerson ; sh:minCount 1 ; sh:maxCount 1 ] ;
sh:property [ sh:path se:basis ; sh:hasValue se:taxIdInListing ] ;
sh:property [ sh:path se:basisEntry ; sh:class se:Listing ; sh:minCount 1 ] .
se:FacilityShape a sh:NodeShape ; # a site is never a legal person
sh:targetClass se:Facility ;
sh:not [ sh:class se:Organisation ] .
se:PostListingContractRule a sh:NodeShape ;
sh:targetClass se:ProcurementContract ;
sh:rule [
a sh:SPARQLRule ;
sh:prefixes se:Prefixes ;
sh:construct """
CONSTRUCT {
?s a se:PostListingContract ;
se:contract $this ; se:seller ?seller ;
se:followsRestriction ?r ; se:restrictingJurisdiction ?jur ;
prov:wasDerivedFrom $this , ?r , ?id .
}
WHERE {
$this se:contractKind "purchase" ; se:buyer ?buyer ;
se:seller ?seller ; se:signedOn ?signed .
?id a se:IdentityAssertion ; se:recordEntity ?buyer ;
se:legalPerson ?person ; se:basis se:taxIdInListing .
?r se:appliesTo ?person ; se:jurisdiction ?jur ;
se:instrument se:assetFreeze ; se:validFrom ?from .
{ ?r a se:Listing ; se:dateKind se:officialDate }
UNION
{ ?r a se:DerivedBlocking ; se:dateKind se:derivedDate }
OPTIONAL { ?r se:validTo ?to }
FILTER (?signed > ?from && (!BOUND(?to) || ?signed <= ?to))
# report the earliest restriction in force at signing
FILTER NOT EXISTS {
?r2 se:appliesTo ?person ; se:jurisdiction ?jur ;
se:instrument se:assetFreeze ; se:validFrom ?f2 .
{ ?r2 a se:Listing ; se:dateKind se:officialDate }
UNION
{ ?r2 a se:DerivedBlocking ; se:dateKind se:derivedDate }
OPTIONAL { ?r2 se:validTo ?t2 }
FILTER (?f2 < ?from && (!BOUND(?t2) || ?signed <= ?t2))
}
BIND (IRI(CONCAT(STR($this), "/post-listing/",
STRAFTER(STR(?jur), "#"))) AS ?s)
}
""" ] .1. Publisher. Published by Trace Origin LLC, an independent research organisation. The analysis and opinions are its own.
2. Sources. Russian federal procurement contracts (via clearspending.ru), the War&Sanctions records of Ukraine's Defence Intelligence (retrieved 15 November 2026), official sanctions lists of eight jurisdictions (via OpenSanctions), and EU and US legal texts. Trace Origin does not warrant their accuracy.
3. What the records show. Contracts signed between Russian companies inside Russia, read through a mirror of the official register. The mirror does not show whether a contract was carried out or where a machine was built, and no record used shows how a machine reached the seller. Makes and models are GUR's attributions unless the contract names them.
4. No allegation. Nothing in this report states or implies that any named manufacturer, dealer or other company acted unlawfully, or that any manufacturer sold to any buyer named here.